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301400Z AUG 89

1. TEAR LINE INFO BELOW WAS PROVIDED BY [REDACTED] (P/1) AT SCHEDULED MEETING WITH C/O [REDACTED] ON 28 AUG 89. P/1 OBTAINED THE INFORMATION THROUGH NORMAL COURSE OF HIS DUTIES AS [REDACTED] OFFICER. P/1 PERSONALLY CONDUCTED PARA ONE DEFENSIVE SECURITY CHECK IN 1986. PARA TWO STEMS FROM P/1'S EARLIER ASSIGNMENT IN MALTA AND FACT THAT HE WAS QUESTIONED RE ANY SOURCES/CONTACTS HE COULD TURN OVER TO [REDACTED] OFFICERS IN MALTA AT THE AIRPORT DURING HIS LATEST TRIP HERE.

APPROVED FOR RELEASE
DATE: FEB 2008

2. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION REGARDING THE PARTICULAR SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS AT LUQA INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT WERE PROVIDED BY [REDACTED] WHO ACTS AS TRANSLATOR DURING MEETINGS WITH P/1. [REDACTED] POSITION ALLOWS HER DIRECT ACCESS TO BAGGAGE HANDLING AT THE AIRPORT.

-----TEAR LINE-----

COUNTRY: MALTA/LIBYA

SUBJ: PRIVATE COMMENTS BY LIBYAN ARAB AIRLINES EMPLOYEE ON EXTERNAL SECURITY OFFICE SURVEY OF LUQA INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT IN MALTA

TEXT: 1. SPEAKING PRIVATELY, A LIBYAN ARAB AIRLINES (LAA) EMPLOYEE SAID THAT THE LIBYAN EXTERNAL SECURITY OFFICE (ESO) CONDUCTED A DEFENSIVE SECURITY SURVEY OF THE LUQA INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT (LIA) IN 1986. ACCORDING TO THE LAA EMPLOYEE, THE SURVEY REVEALED THAT LIA SECURITY CONSISTED OF THREE STEPS: AT THE CHECK-IN COUNTER, ON THE CONVEYOR BELT WHERE LUGGAGE IS SCREENED BY EXPLOSIVE DETECTION DEVICES (NFI) AND ON THE TARMAC WHERE PASSENGERS IDENTIFY THEIR LUGGAGE. THE ESO CONCLUDED THAT THESE CONTROLS RULED OUT INSERTION OF UNACCOMPANIED BAGGAGE CONTAINING EXPLOSIVES (NFI) ON TO ONWARD FLIGHTS. (FIELD COMMENT: THE PRACTICE OF REQUIRING PASSENGERS TO IDENTIFY LUGGAGE PRIOR TO BOARDING APPEARS TO HAVE BEEN DISCONTINUED.)

SECRET